were a subiect of much partisan discussion throughout the early period of his leadership of the Liberal party. He was depicted by some of his political opponents as a deserter who in the hour of Canada's agony had migrated to the United States in order to avoid military service. By himself and his apologists he was described as a man whose "assistance was evidently of real value from the standpoint of helping to win the 
relations of the Church with the Governments of Italy and France were such that, even ff the Church had had the power, it would have lacked the inclination to involve 'Canada on behalf of France or Italy. The Church apart, Canada's connection with France was historical and cultural and therefore of litfie consequence or practical effect upon a community and government dominated by business and economic influences. Three choices in fact remained to the Canadian Government: (1) non-involvement, either as a conscious policy or in the form of a preservation of colonial isolation from international politics as an activity in which Canadians had neither the capacity nor the interest to participate; (2) an involvement in close collaboration with the British Government; ($) an orientation of policy towards the United States.
The Boer War and the Russo-Japanese War had given Sir Willrid Laurier an opportunity to realize something of the dittlculties which were in store for a Canadian political leader as a consequence of the changing and worsening relations of the Great l•owers. Until after the election of 1908, however, he managed to avoid any commitment which seriously involved the use of Canadian men and resources in the international struggle. The refusal of the German Emperor to consider a reduction of German naval building in August, 1908, followed by the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia Herzegovina in October, created a state of alarm in Europe which manifested itself in Canada as a press agitation to "do something." The Opposition in Ottawa raised the question of armaments, and Sir Willrid felt obliged, finally, to make a choice.
He decided upon involvement on behalf of Great Britain, the construction of a .Canadian armament, and the training of Canadians for military and naval service. In order to make this decision more palatable he proposed to reserve to the Canadian Parliament the decision concerning the use of the Canadian armed forces and to maintain the Canadian character of such forces, which he depicted as the means of defending Canadian shores and .Canadian territory. For those who might object to the imprint of maple leaves rather than Union Jacks upon the armaments, he pointed to the fact that the Canadian undertaking was part of an Imperial effort which aimed at a wide mobilization of men and resources and a defence in depth calculated to permit Great Britain the more sharply and heavily to concentrate her naval effort. not according to race but according to social strata? x People with wealth and social power tended to regard involvement in international rivalries as both desirable and necessary; those with litfie or no social power other than their votes and their capacity for acting together tended to regard involvement with indifference, bewilderment, and very frequently hostility. That acute and reactionary observer of the Canadian scene, J. Castell Hopkins, was right when he described the state of the public mind in 1918-14 as one of "extreme Pacificism. "•"• By the mid-summer of 1910 the Laurier Government was making heavy weather. Its foreign policy was an embarrassment, and the heavy cost of Liberal prosperity to most of the people was being felt with greater severity. Real standards of .life were being adversely affected among a wide constituency? In July-August, 1910, the great strike on the Grand Trunk Raftway brought the prestige of the Government low; and, when it was revealed in November that Mackenzie King's intervention in the strike had enabled the management of the Grand Trunk to blacklist and downgrade men and deprive them of their pensions, the Laurier Government faced the Christmas recess of 1910 in a fotmdering condition. x• The policy of Reciprocity offered to Parliament after the Christmas recess represented an attempt to escape from the political and economic impasse to which the Liberals had come. ,Having reiected the first choice and discovered the volume of obje. ctions to the second, Laurier embraced the third choice open to him: an American orientation for Canadian policy. This, he discovered, excited the indignation of many of the socially powerful elements without in any way appeasing the populace. 'Indeed, Reciprocity succeeded in fusing together several social strata to produce a popular political movement united in its opposition, ff not in its advocacy. Robert Laird Borden was voicing something more than a conventional platitude when he declared after the election of September, 1911, that the defeat of the Liberals was a "triumph of the Canadian people rather than any political party. "x• xxSir Clifford Sifton had no illusions on this subject. The Dafoe Papers contain a large volume of material which supports the conclusion that differences about foreign policy and its consequences were based on class rather than race.
X2Hopkins In assessing a politician, Sir George Foster once asked: "Can he impress the men he must lead to victory or defeat, and the masses who are to be moulded? "2• In dealing with men whom it was necessary to impress Mackenzie King was a discreet imperialist. When engaged in the business of "moulding the masses" he could, however, take another line. From all this it might be concluded that the Liberal party was abandoning the second of the three practical choices which we have postulated, and was adopting the first. Whatever may have been true of Laurier, Mackenzie King was moving towards the third choice-a pro-American orientation. In 1914 he began to organize, with American money supplied by the Carnegie Trustees, It may be, however, that organised labour in the United States will realise the opportunities and the handicaps likely to come to certain industries through the changed conditions in Europe and will be prepared to cease hostilities where industrial strife at present exists, in order that on the one hand labour may reap with capital a fuller measure of the harvest, or, in industries that may be affected, protect itself against consequences that are certain to arise .... Looking at the ultimate, rather than the immediate effect, there is, speaking generally, going to be a large amount of unemployment as a consequence of this war, and once the war is over, thousands of men and their families in the Old World are going to seek future employment in the New. In certain in, dustties it is going to be easy for employers to find all the labour they desire, and unions will be confronted with a new problem .... a5 A universally accepted interpretation of neutrality [he wrote] very properly prevents the United States of America from taking, or appearing to take, any side in the present struggle. On the other hand, the standards she has set herself and for other nations would seem to make it impossible for her to be indifferent to an attitude towards belligerents, higher and more far reaching than that which a mere recognition of the generally accepted rights of neutrals would permit her to take. This the Administration has already recognised by allowing it to be known that the Government would not view with fayour the exercise of the rights of loans being made by American citizens to the government of one of the belligerent nations,aS--a right the exercise of which is perfectly legal, and wholly compatible with strict neutrality. No one familiar with American public opinion will, even for a moment, believe that this view of the Administration has been taken through any desire to lessen the power of France in the present struggle. On the contrary, it is, I believe, everywhere recognised that it is but a part of the higher sense of obligation in international affairs which has been the point of educational effort in recent years on the part of some of your most distinguished citizens. The doctrine that war might be averted were the Nations of the earth to refuse credit to any country that engages in war without first submitting the question at issue to the Hague Tribunal, has, while failing thus far of acceptance, nevertheless, made itself felt to the extent of enabling the Administration to take the stand it has in this particular, and in causing other nations to respect the stand thus taken.
Mr. Rockefeller was thus encouraged not to worry about the problem of recognizing real unions. All that the situation required was a iudicious course of company unionism. Mackenzie King did not limit his connections in the United
May it not be assumed that as respects all other questions which may arise, a like attitude will command a like respect? In maintaining the higher ground, and continuing to view with open disfavour other acts that a strict neutrality might permit, but which may serve to prolong the European conflict, may not the United States be a means of advancing the whole basis of world civilization, and at the same time, in the sum of things, greatly further its own asked Mackenzie King whether he considered it necessary to enquire into events in Colorado and to make them known, Mackenzie King replied that it is best to let bygones be bygones. Obviously this disposition to forget was strongly at work when Mackenzie King considered the question of the First World War. He possessed neither consistency of understanding nor consistency of emotion in relation to that great political event. This, perhaps, was one of the sources of his future strength in a world where power relationships were rapidly altering and empires and classes changing more quickly than most men and women could easily contemplate.
